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ABSTRACT 
It is hard to disagree with the idea of responsible innovation (henceforth, RI), as it enables policy-
makers, scientists, technology developers, and the public to better understand and respond to the 
social, ethical, and policy challenges raised by new and emerging technologies. RI has gained 
prominence in policy agenda in Europe and the United States over the last few years.  And, along 
with its rising importance in policy-making, there is also a burgeoning research literature on the topic.  
Given the historical context of which RI emerges, it should not be surprising that the current 
discourse on RI is predominantly based on liberal democratic values. Yet, the bias towards liberal 
democratic values will inevitably limit the discussion of RI, especially in the cases where liberal 
democratic values are not taken for granted. As such, there is an urgent need to return to the 
normative foundation of RI, and to explore the notion of ‘responsible innovation’ from nonliberal 
democratic perspectives. Against this background, this paper seeks to demonstrate the problematic 
consequences of RI solely grounded on or justified by liberal democratic values. This paper will cast 
the argument in the form of a dilemma to be labelled as The Decent Nonliberal Peoples’ Dilemma 
and use it to illustrate the problems of the Western bias.  
 
KEYWORDS: Responsible Innovation, Liberal Democracy, Decent Nonliberal Peoples, Dilemma 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: An early version of this paper was presented at the Climate Engineering 
Conference 2014 with the title “Responsible Innovation and the Danger of Technological Imperialism: 
A Case of Climate Engineering”. The author wants to thank the audiences for insightful comments. 
The author also likes to thank Tom Wang and the colleagues at the Department of Social Science, 
Hang Seng Management College for extensive discussions on the ideas in the paper. 
 
CONFLICT OF INTEREST: The author declares that he has no conflict of interest. 
  
RI AND DECENT NONLIBERAL PEOPLES 
 2 
Responsible Innovation for Decent Nonliberal Peoples:  
A Dilemma? 
Introduction 
It is hard to disagree with the idea of responsible innovation (henceforth, RI), i.e. to make scientific 
research and technological innovation “a transparent, interactive process by which societal actors and 
innovators become mutually responsive to each other with a view to the (ethical) acceptability, 
sustainability and societal desirability of the innovation process and its marketable products (in order 
to allow a proper embedding of scientific and technological advances in our society)” (von Schomberg 
2012, 50), as the objective of RI is to empower policy-makers, scientists, technology developers, and 
the public to better understand and respond to social, ethical, and policy challenges raised by new and 
emerging technologies. RI has gained prominence in policy agenda in Europe and the United States 
over the last few years.1 Along with its rising importance in policy-making, there is also a burgeoning 
academic research on the topic.2 Although the exact meaning of ‘responsible innovation’ remains 
under debate, existing understandings of RI are strongly associated with liberal democratic values, in 
particular freedom, equality and participation (see, e.g. von Schomberg 2012, 2013, 2014; Owen et al. 
2012, 2013b; Stilgoe et al. 2013).3  
Given the historical context of which RI emerges, it should not be surprising that the current 
discourse on RI is predominantly based on liberal democratic values (Owen et al. 2012; de Saille 2015). 
Yet, the bias towards these values will inevitably limit the discussion of RI, especially in cases where 
liberal democratic values are not taken for granted.4 More specifically, restricting the discussion of RI 
to be based on liberal democratic values will have unintuitive and undesirable consequences. In 
addition, neglecting the important questions about the plausible normative foundations of RI will 
                                                          
1 For a historical overview of the idea of RI and related ideas, see Owen et al. (2012) and Stilgoe et al. (2013).  
2 For example, the Journal of Responsible Innovation is established in 2014 to devote to RI, see Guston et al 
(2014) for the rationales to start a journal on RI. Also, see Owen et al. (2013a), van den Hoven et al. (2014), and 
Koops et al. (2015) for some examples of recent work on RI.  
3 There are multiple ways to construe the ‘liberal democratic values’ and interpret ‘freedom’ and ‘equality’. In 
this paper, I view them primarily via the liberal democratic notion of personhood, i.e. persons are viewed as 
independent, rational, and self-determining beings, who are the best and only candidates to determine their own 
course of life. Accordingly, individuals ought to be consulted and given justifications for any decisions that 
interfere with their ways of life, and their voices too ought to be weighted equally because individuals are seen 
as equal counterparts. Nussbaum succinctly points out that “at the heart of [the liberal democratic] tradition is a 
twofold intuition about human beings: namely, that all, just by being human, are of equal dignity and worth, no 
matter where they are situated in society, and that the primary source of this worth is a power of moral choice 
within them, a power that consists in the ability to plan a life in accordance with one’s own evaluation of ends… 
[T]he moral equality of persons gives them a fair claim to certain types of treatment of debate within the 
tradition, but the shared starting point is that this treatment must do two closely related things. It must respect 
and promote the liberty of choice, and it must respect and promote the equal worth of persons as choosers” 
(Nussbaum 1999, 57). Following Nussbaum, I take freedom (as non-interference) and equality as the core values 
of liberal democratic worldview, and participation is a manifestation of these values.  
4 Of course, it too depends on the claim that liberal democratic values are not the only legitimate values to justify 
a political system. Indeed, if proponents of liberal democratic values insist those are the only legitimate values, 
then they might reject the consequences I will illustrate as ‘problematic’. I shall return to this briefly when I 
discuss the possible responses to the dilemma.  
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prevent us from seeing the problematic consequences that could be detrimental to the development 
of RI. Accordingly, there is an urgent need to return to the questions about the normative foundations 
of RI, and to explore the idea of ‘responsible innovation’ from nonliberal democratic perspectives. 
Against this background, this paper seeks to demonstrate the problematic consequences of RI 
solely grounded on or justified by liberal democratic values. This ‘Western’ bias in RI has been briefly 
noted in the literature (see, e.g. Macnaghten et al. 2014), but the discussion here differs in that I will 
cast the argument in the form of a dilemma to be labelled The Decent Nonliberal Peoples’ Dilemma 
and use it to illustrate the problems of the ‘Western’ bias. Before proceeding, it should be pointed out 
that the main objective of this paper is to make explicit one of the problems in the current discourse 
on RI, and thus to prevent it from being entrenched in the policy and scholarly discourse. Although the 
paper will outline some possible ways of out of the dilemma, I shall not pretend to provide any 
satisfactory solutions given the intricacies involved in resolving it. 
The Decent Nonliberal Peoples’ Dilemma  
The Decent Nonliberal Peoples’ Dilemma is based on the main assumption that RI requires liberal 
democratic values, and the main assumption can be interpreted in two ways. A strong interpretation 
of the main assumption refers to the view that the goals of RI are grounded on a specific set of values, 
which is liberal democratic in nature. In short, RI reflects a set of substantive values for research and 
innovation. Alternatively, a moderate interpretation of the main assumption refers to the view that 
the goals of RI are not inherently grounded on a specific set of values, but the frameworks, institutions, 
procedures, and/or practices of RI are nonetheless viewed as best justified by liberal democratic 
values. Although there are two interpretations of the main assumption, as it will become clear, they 
will leave us with the same dilemma. It should also be noted that the problematic consequences 
demonstrated in the dilemma will be more pronounced in the strong interpretation than in the 
moderate interpretation.  
Let’s now return to the dilemma. In what follows, I shall argue that if one accepts the main 
assumption, it entails either of the following consequences: (D1) decent nonliberal states (or, people 
who disagree with liberal democratic values) cannot have RI; or, (D2) decent nonliberal states can have 
RI only if they introduce or are imposed liberal democratic values into their societies. Both (D1) and 
(D2), however, are problematic for RI. To resolve the dilemma, it is necessary to either reject the main 
assumption, or respond to (D1) or (D2).  
Since the notion ‘decent nonliberal states’ plays an essential role in illustrating the problematic 
consequences of (D1) and (D2), it needs to be spelt out clearly. By ‘decent nonliberal states’, I follow 
John Rawls’ understanding set out in The Law of Peoples (Rawls 1999).5 Rawls sets out two criteria for 
a nonliberal state to be considered as decent. Firstly, the nonliberal state should not be aggressive 
(Rawls 1999, 64). Secondly, the nonliberal state’s system of law should (i) secure some basic human 
rights for its members in accordance with its common good idea of justice; (ii) it should also impose 
                                                          
5 In The Laws of Peoples, Rawls’ focuses on one form of decent nonliberal states, i.e. decent hierarchical 
societies, but he did not deny the possibility of other forms of decent nonliberal states (see, e.g. Rawls 1999, 4). 
In this paper, I shall use the term ‘decent nonliberal states’ to include all forms of decent societies that are not 
liberal democratic in nature. 
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moral duties and obligations on all persons within the state, which those moral duties and obligations 
are derived from their common good idea of justice; and, (iii) the government should sincerely hold 
that the law is guided by a common good idea of justice (Rawls 1999, 65-67). Moreover, the decent 
nonliberal state has a ‘decent consultation hierarchy’ that looks after the important interests of all its 
members and provides an opportunity for different voices to be heard (Rawls 1999, 71-78). 
Accordingly, (D1) is unwarranted. Given the decency of decent nonliberal states, i.e. the respect for 
(some) human rights, the moral duties and responsibilities of its members, and the common good idea 
of justice embraced by its members, together with the presence of the decent consultation hierarchy, 
it seems unreasonable to reject their capacity and willingness to ensure “the (ethical) acceptability, 
sustainability and societal desirability of the innovation process and its marketable products”. Also, 
(D2) is either (politically) infeasible because it calls for a political overhaul of the nonliberal states, or 
immoral because it could raise an imperialistic concern in global science and technology policy. 
It should be pointed out that I recognise well that Rawls’ notion of ‘decent nonliberal states’ is not 
without its problems and limitations (see, e.g. Beitz 2000; Caney 2002). Yet, my argument for the 
dilemma only requires one to accept the existence of decent nonliberal states and their legitimacy. 
Nonetheless, I think Rawls’ notion has the merit of foregrounding the existence of decent nonliberal 
states that are based on a different normative foundation and are too legitimate. In short, for those 
who disagree with Rawls’ notion of ‘decent nonliberal states’, it can be viewed merely as a heuristic 
device in my argument. 
Responsible Innovation and Liberal Democratic Values 
As the Decent Nonliberal Peoples’ Dilemma depends on the acceptance of the main assumption, it is 
essential to show that it is either explicitly or implicitly accepted by proponents of RI. In this section, I 
shall show that there is good reason to think it is indeed so in the current discourse on RI before 
moving on to the two horns of the dilemma. 
Proponents of RI has acknowledged the strong affinity between RI and liberal democratic values 
(see, e.g. von Schomberg 2012, 2013, 2014; Owen et al. 2012, 2013b; Stilgoe et al. 2013; Stahl 2013; 
Valdivia & Guston 2015). One of the clearest accounts on the relation between RI and democracy is 
offered by Rene von Schomberg (2012, 2013, 2014), who argues that research and innovation need to 
be guided and governed by certain normative anchor points. Those normative anchors are 
conceptualised with substantial understandings of “ethical acceptability”, “sustainability”, and “social 
desirability” derived from the Treaty of European Union and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union. He also argues research and innovation processes should reflect a deliberative 
democracy through the inclusion and involvement of stakeholders and other interested parties in 
decision-making on science and technology. Here, public participation in science and technology is 
considered to be a normative requirement, and it draws on deliberative democracy that takes 
“outcomes [to be] legitimate to the extent they receive reflective assent through participation in 
authentic deliberation by all those subject to the decision in question” (Dryzek 2001, 651; also, see 
Benhabib 1996). Behind this ideal of deliberative democracy is a specific understanding of personhood: 
individuals are free (i.e. freedom as non-interference), and thus they ought to be consulted with and 
given justifications for decisions that could have significant impacts on their lives; and, individuals are 
RI AND DECENT NONLIBERAL PEOPLES 
 5 
equal, and thus their voices should be weighed equally and to be (actively) sought after in decision-
making processes.6 Accordingly, von Schomberg’s approach to RI appears to embrace a strong 
interpretation of the main assumption, as he invokes a set of substantive values to specify the goals of 
research and innovation, i.e. the EU fundamental values and the ideal of deliberative democracy.7 
Richard Owen and his colleagues (Owen et al. 2012, 2013b; also, see Stilgoe et al. 2013) offer a 
different approach to RI that is sensitive to contexts in its application, and therefore is more open to 
other normative traditions. They characterise RI as “a continuous commitment to be anticipatory, 
reflective, inclusively deliberative, and responsive [in the process of research and innovation]” (Owen 
et al. 2013b, 29; original emphasis), and the four dimensions of RI are intended to identify and 
prescribe the procedures and practices that ensure research and innovation being (more) responsible.8 
For instance, the dimension of anticipation requires “describing and analyzing those intended and 
potentially unintended impacts that might arise [… that] serve as a useful entry point for reflection on 
the purposes, promises, and possible impacts of innovation.” (Owen et al. 2013b, 38). The dimension 
of reflection requires “reflecting on underlying purposes, motivations, and potential impacts, [and the 
limits of knowledge of research and innovation]” (ibid.). The dimension of deliberation refers to 
“inclusively opening up visions, purposes, questions, and dilemmas to broad, collective deliberation 
through processes of dialogue, engagement, and debate, inviting and listening to wider perspectives 
from publics and diverse stakeholders” (ibid.) that facilitate reframing of the issues and identifying 
potential conflicts. Finally, the dimension of responsiveness is to use the “collective process of 
reflexivity to both set the direction and influence the subsequent trajectory and pace of innovation, 
through effective mechanisms of participatory and anticipatory governance” (ibid.). 
Bert-Jaap Koops (2015) rightly points out that Owen et al. do not aim at specifying goals for 
research and innovation with substantive values in their approach to RI, their aim instead is to make 
the process of research and innovation (more) responsible by introducing procedural values such as 
robustness, legitimacy, and inclusiveness into the process. In other words, their approach leaves open 
what goals should be pursued by research and innovation, and what substantive values ought to guide 
research and innovation. What their approach offers is this: with an eye to responsibility, how the 
goals of research and innovation are to be defined. So construed, Owen et al. approach differs 
significantly from von Schomberg approach in their attitude towards the main assumption, as they 
refrain from asserting that the goals of research and innovation need to be grounded on a specific set 
of substantive values. 
Yet, the ideal of deliberative democracy remains central in Owen et al.’s approach. The four 
dimensions of RI identified by Owen et al. and the specific procedures and practices prescribed to 
realise those dimensions are in effect a manifestation of the ideal of deliberative democracy. Owen et 
al. conceive the objectives of RI as enabling us to reflect on the purposes of research and innovation, 
to explore and negotiate the social, ethical, and political boundaries of science and technology, to 
                                                          
6 For a more extensive discussion of the relation between public participation and the liberal democratic view of 
personhood, see Wong (2013). 
7 A similar account of RI, which too is based on the European values, is provided by van den Hoven et al. (2013, 
23-24). 
8 It is worth noting that the terms for the four dimensions are “anticipation”, “reflexivity”, “inclusion”, and 
"responsiveness" in Stilgoe et al. (2013), thus are different from the terms used by Owen et al. (2013b), but their 
explanation for the four dimensions does not differ notably. 
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proactively guide research and innovation to desirable ends, and to be open-minded, adaptive, and 
responsive to the changing environment as well as various views, perspectives and framings of issues 
in science and technology. In other words, they view RI as an opening-up of science and innovation for 
public deliberation and public decision-making. At the same time, they also assert that these 
objectives introduce the ideal of deliberative democracy in their approach to RI, i.e. being deliberative 
is required to achieve them (Owen et al. 2013, 35-38). In effect, Stilgoe describes this approach as a 
democratisation of the governance of intent that seeks not only to open up the research agendas for 
the public to discuss and deliberate but also to open up the discussion and decision-making of the very 
purpose(s) of research and innovation themselves (Stilgoe 2011; also see Owen 2013). In short, even 
though Owen et al.’s approach does not specify the goals of research and innovation with liberal 
democratic values, the procedures and practices prescribed by their approach are nonetheless to be 
justified by the key democratic values that every individuals has standing to participate in (informed) 
public deliberation and that legitimacy of a decision and/or policy is derived from the public 
deliberation.9 As such, it is fair to conclude that Owen et al. do endorse a moderate interpretation of 
the main assumption. 
It is important to point out that I am not disagreeing with the objectives of RI as characterised in 
Owen et al.’s approach, what I am disagreeing with is to overemphasise the importance of 
(deliberative) democratic values as the best, if not the only, values for accomplishing the objectives of 
RI and thereby viewing those values as required by RI. Particularly, how the objectives of RI are best 
realised is an empirical question, and it depends on various contingent factors including the social and 
political conditions, which do not always favour liberal democratic values and practices. Accordingly, 
liberal democratic values may not always be the best set of values to ground the goals of RI. 
Here, Owen et al. could argue that public deliberation – or, more generally, deliberative democracy 
– is the only means of governance that properly ensure the legitimacy of research agendas, which, in 
turn, provides a normative justification for their approach to RI (Stilgoe et al. 2013, 1576-1577).10 
However, as Dean J. Machin (2012) rightly points out that (political) legitimacy is not derived from 
democratic values per se, but through satisfying the requirements of (i) horizontal equality between 
individuals, (ii) acceptable vertical inequality between decision-makers and the public, (iii) publicity, i.e. 
decisions should be made in a transparent and non-secret manner, and (iv) individuals having some 
institutionalised opportunities for a voice in decisions that affect them. Accordingly, nonliberal 
                                                          
9 Their commitment to the values of deliberative democracy (or, democratisation) is most explicitly stated in 
Stilgoe et al., where they state “[o]ur approach […] has concentrated on the means of governances such that an 
improved – more democratic or more legitimate – consideration of ends become possible. […] In this sense, we 
have second-order normative commitments to democratisation, which we see as vital for the good governance 
of science and innovation” (Stilgoe et al. 2013, 1577; my emphasis). 
10 Stirling (2005) has summarised the three rationales for public participation (or public deliberation) as 
“normative”, “instrumental”, and “substantive”, i.e. “[f]rom a normative view, participation is just the right thing 
to do. From an instrumental perspective, it is a better way to achieve particular ends. In substantive terms, it 
leads to better ends” (Stirling 2005, 220). It is, however, unclear why public participation is in itself a (morally) 
right thing to do. For Stirling, it is because public participation satisfies “Habermasian principles of ‘ideal speech’, 
with Rawlsian notions of ‘public reason’ and with a multitude of derived evaluative criteria held ideally to be 
associated with effective engagement in social appraisal. […] In short, under [the] normative democratic view, 
participation is self-evidently a good thing in its own right, without the need for further justification” (Stirling 
2005: 221). However, Stirling has not discussed whether this apply when liberal democratic values are not 
favoured by the public. 
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democratic political systems are also legitimate so long as they can satisfy (i)-(iv).11 More importantly, 
if Machin is right, then there is little reason to hold that RI requires (deliberative) democratic values, or 
that (deliberative) democracy is the only mean of governance that can properly ensure the legitimacy 
of research agendas. 
Nothing above has conclusively demonstrated non-European values and/or nonliberal democratic 
values are inherently incompatible with the existing approaches to RI. Indeed, it is certainty true that 
von Schomberg has not explicitly rejected the possibility of non-European values being the sources of 
RI’s normative anchor points, or that Owen et al.’s approach is necessarily incompatible with 
nonliberal democratic institutions. However, at the moment, I fail to see any serious attention and 
detailed discussions of non-European values – or, more broadly, nonliberal democratic values – in the 
current discourse on RI.12 While the lack of attention and discussion might due to the relative newness 
of the concept of RI, I reckon the lack of attention and discussion given to other normative traditions in 
the discourse of RI could lead to an unhealthy negligence of the importance and relevance of 
alternative normative foundations for RI. 
The First Horn of the Dilemma: Can Decent Nonliberal Peoples Have 
Responsible Innovation? 
The previous section attempts to illustrate the prominence of the main assumption in the current 
discourse on RI through von Schomberg’s and Owen et al.’s approaches. It is true that the discussion 
has not shown that every proponent of RI endorses the main assumption, but the emphasis on 
European and/or liberal democratic values in the current discourse and the lack of attention to non-
European and nonliberal democratic values have provided adequate reasons to worry that other 
normative foundations have been neglected in the discussion. This is worrying because the omission of 
nonliberal democratic perspectives and the acceptance of the main assumption lead to the Decent 
Nonliberal Peoples’ Dilemma. 
The first horn of the Decent Nonliberal Peoples’ Dilemma asserts that (D1) decent nonliberal states 
cannot have RI. (D1) is the logical consequence of endorsing the main assumption, which states that RI 
requires liberal democratic values either to ground the goals of research and innovation, or to justify 
the frameworks, institutions, procedures, and/or practices with them. Accordingly, by definition, 
nonliberal peoples are incapable of research and innovation responsibly because they do not have the 
proper set of values to ground the goals of research and innovation, nor they can justify RI with their 
normative foundations. 
There are, however, good reasons to reject (D1). For instance, it is unclear why public participation, 
i.e. a key (semi-)institutional practice in RI based on liberal democratic values, cannot be justified 
merely on instrumental grounds or by other normative traditions (see, e.g. Wong 2013; also see Chan 
                                                          
11 Machin (2012) argues that Rawls’s formulation of decent consultation hierarchy does not satisfy the 
requirement of horizontal equality because it does not represent individuals qua individuals, but he too points 
out that if it can be adequately modified to represent individuals qua individuals, then it will satisfy the 
requirement. In this paper, the specific details about decent consultation hierarchy are irrelevant; what is 
important is that there are nonliberal democratic political systems that are as legitimate as liberal democratic 
political systems. 
12 One notable exception is Arnaldi et al. (2015). 
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2007; Angle 2009). It is also unclear why other normative traditions are incapable of guiding research 
and innovation with an eye on “(ethical) acceptability, sustainability and societal desirability”.  
For example, the idea of Minben (“the people as the basis”) in Confucian political philosophy places 
an overt emphasis on the government’s (or, ruler’s) responsibility for the welfare of the people. A 
central tenet in Confucian political philosophy is that (political) legitimacy of the government is based 
on the will of the people, but it regards the relationship between the government and the public to be 
analogous to the parent-son relationship and takes it to be paternalistic and meritocratic, i.e. the 
government (or ruler) should not be shied away from promoting their view(s) of the good to the 
people (see, e.g. Murthy 2000; Wang & Titunik 2000; Bai 2008).13 Accordingly, the Minben philosophy 
of Confucianism can too provide a normative foundation to include the public interests in science and 
technology policy agenda-settings through public dialogues, as public dialogues enable the 
government to better understand the needs of the people and being more responsive to those needs; 
however, public participation’s role in Confucian political philosophy remains essentially advisory, and 
the final decisions are to be made by the government authoritatively based on its conception of the 
good (see, Bai 2008; He & Warren 2011). In this respect, the Minben philosophy of Confucianism is in 
opposition to the liberal democratic values of freedom as non-interference and equality as voices 
having the same weight (Elstein 2010). 
This is not to assert any normative traditions can be used in grounding or justifying RI without 
further adjustments and qualifications. In fact, a more detailed discussion of Confucian political 
philosophy and the idea of Minben is required to fully elaborate the plausibility of a Confucian 
framework of RI. Yet, it does assert there is little reason to reject the possibility that other normative 
traditions can ground and justify a version of RI based on their values. In short, (D1) is unwarranted. 
The Second Horn of the Dilemma: Some Imperialistic Concerns 
Another consequence entailed by the main assumption is (D2), i.e. decent nonliberal people have to 
accept liberal democratic values in order to have RI, where liberal democratic values can be introduced 
to decent nonliberal states either (i) by the decent nonliberal states’ own acceptance of those values, 
or (ii) by an imposition of those values from liberal democratic states. Both (i) and (ii), however, are 
problematic. 
First, (i) suggests an overhaul of the value system is required in order to introduce RI to decent 
nonliberal states (which, after accepting the liberal democratic values, will no longer be nonliberal 
states). The problem with this is that (i) seems infeasible. Particularly, a replacement and/or addition 
of basic values – if they happen at all – require an extended period of time, and the local (traditional) 
values often leave an imprint on the value system and shape the cultural change (Inglehart & Baker 
2000). If RI is a pressing issue in science and technology policy, it would be impractical to require 
decent nonliberal states to accept liberal democratic values before developing their version(s) of RI. 
More importantly, as I have argued, other normative traditions can also provide the normative basis of 
RI. Accordingly, liberal democratic values might not be necessary after all.  
                                                          
13 The will of the people, in turn, (re)presents the will of heaven, which is the ultimate source of (political) 
authority. For an overview of the idea of Minben in Confucian political philosophy, see, Wang & Titunik (2000). 
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Second, (ii) is also problematic, as the imposition of values from outside can be view as morally 
problematic. For instance, the imposition of values can be achieved through direct intervention, but it 
is unclear how direct intervention can be justified in the context of RI. Particularly, if decent nonliberal 
states are legitimate, and they do not violate a minimal set of rights of their community members, a 
direct intervention fails to tolerate and respect diversity in values, which are the core principles in 
liberalism itself (Rawls 1999). This is, of course, not to suggest the principles of toleration and respect 
are without criticisms (see, e.g. Tan 1998; Beitz 2000; Buchanan 2000); however, the common 
objections to the principles tend to focus on considerations about the right and the just, whereas RI 
focuses primarily on what can research and innovation contribute to the good of the people. It is, 
therefore, more difficult to reject the principles in the context of RI without raising imperialistic 
concerns, as our world is characterised by a plurality of the good life, i.e. there are diverse, and 
possibly conflicting, views of the good life that are equally valid, it seems that there is no good 
justiﬁcation to impose a speciﬁc view of the good on others.14 
Alternatively, the acceptance of liberal democratic values can be initiated indirectly with 
institutionalisation, e.g. introduction of global standard(s) for research and innovation (Wickson & 
Forsberg 2015; also, see Waldby & Slater 2008). Standardisation can encourage, or indeed require, 
scientists and technology developers to follow a set of procedures if they are to be accepted as 
members of the global network of research and innovation. Liberal democratic values can then be 
introduced to decent nonliberal states with standardisation formulated on the basis of those values.15 
So construed, those who do not accept liberal democratic values will be excluded from international 
collaborations and will be barred from the global market because they do not satisfy the international 
standard(s) of RI. Hence, standardisation is an inherently value-laden project, as it designates the 
normative criteria for inclusion to the global network. Here, one of the major adverse implications of 
the introduction of value-laden standard(s) of RI appears to be the delegitimisation of the plausibility 
of RI based on local values, especially when those values come into conflict with the liberal democratic 
values, as the local values (or, the RI based on local values) do not enable scientists and technology 
developers to be recognised as members of the global network of research and innovation. 
Of course, it is possible to include local values (and decent nonliberal states) in the creation of 
international standard(s); however, to do so their legitimacy and the importance of their values will 
have to be properly acknowledged. In other words, the main assumption that RI requires liberal 
democratic values has to be rejected, and the negligence of other normative traditions cannot be 
sustained if we intend to include other normative traditions into the creation of international 
standard(s). 
                                                          
14 Alternatively, the “plurality of good life” can be illustrated with Rawls’ “the fact of reasonable pluralism,” i.e. 
“a pluralism of comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines [and, more importantly,] a pluralism 
of incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines” (Rawls 1993, p. xvi). Given the reasonableness of the 
comprehensive doctrines, it seems unjustified to reject other’s comprehensive doctrines in favour of one’s own.  
15 There is an important question as to whether it is indeed possible to have a standard (or, a set of procedures) 
representing a specific set of values, e.g. liberal democratic values. This is an important question for those who 
are in favour of standardisation in RI, but it has little implication to my argument. What is important to my 
argument is that standard(s) of RI is (are) not neutral, and standardisation inevitably imposes foreign values 
through institutionalisation. 
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Conclusion 
To reiterate, the aim of this paper is to illustrate the Decent Nonliberal Peoples’ Dilemma resulting 
from overemphasising liberal democratic values in RI. I start with the reminder that there are decent 
nonliberal states, which are legitimate but they are not always in alignment with the liberal democratic 
values. I then point out that if the proponents of RI neglect the normative foundations of decent 
nonliberal states, or take liberal democratic values as the only legitimate normative foundation for RI, 
they will face the problematic consequences characterised by the dilemma. 
It is important not to over-interpret the arguments in this paper, however. Particularly, the aim of 
this paper is not to prove the legitimacy of nonliberal states – decent or otherwise. Instead, the paper 
attempts to show that if decent nonliberal states are legitimate, and their values are too fitting as the 
normative foundation of RI, then the proponents of RI need to take them more seriously in the 
discourse on RI, and to return to the fundamental question(s) concerning the normative foundation of 
RI. 
For those who think liberal democratic values of freedom and equality are essential to RI, they will 
have to demonstrate why those values are indeed essential to RI. Here, they may refer to the recent 
works on cosmopolitanism to support their position (see, e.g. Beitz 1979; Pogge 1992; Tan 2004; 
Caney 2005). This is not the place to discuss the merits and problems of cosmopolitanism, but it is a 
useful reminder for the need to answer the fundamental question(s) concerning the normative 
foundation of RI. 
For those who wish to reject the main assumption and to open up RI to other normative traditions, 
they will have to answer two challenges arise from the inclusion of other normative traditions. The 
first challenge is theoretical, i.e. the inclusion of other normative traditions invite relativism (or, 
impotent pluralism) in that it is unclear what values to be included in RI, and what, if any, value(s) 
should take priority in case of conflict.16 And, the second challenge is practical, i.e. there is little 
research on alternative normative foundations for RI. Indeed, other normative traditions are rarely 
included in the policy and scholarly discourse on RI. In this respect, this paper can be viewed as a call 
for more extensive research on “non-Western” ethics and political philosophy and their relevance to RI. 
It is only through more careful studies of other normative traditions we could determine if, and how, 
they can contribute to RI. 
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